A quarterly summary and brief analysis of significant decisions issued by the Massachusetts Superior Court Business Litigation Session. A service of O’Connor, Carnathan and Mack LLC.
 

August 2004
 

Volume 1
Number 1
Page 3

 

Summarizing opinions from April 1, 2004 through
June. 30, 2004


Plaintiffs Obligated to Identify Trade Secrets with “Rig-orous and Focused Particularity”
 


 
 


 


 



 



 

     

O  T  H  E  R      D  E  C  I  S  I  O  N  S  :

Staffbridge, Inc. v. Gary D. Nelson Associates, Inc. d/b/a Nelson Human Resources Solutions, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 215
(June 11, 2004, 02-4912 BLS) (Van Gestel, J.).

     

Staffbridge, a software company, was hired to provide a workforce management program to the defendant, Gary D. Nelson Associates, Inc. (“Nelson”). Nelson claimed to be dissatisfied with Staffbridge and developed its own program. Staffbridge then sued Nelson claiming, among other things, that it had misappropriated Staffbridge’s trade secrets. In addressing various motions for summary judgment, further discovery, and to extend the tracking order, Judge Van Gestel held that Staffbridge’s prior

 




 

 

 

designation of its trade secrets was inadequate, but afforded it one more chance to make a sufficient designation.

“Both for the defendants to respond to the charges against them, and for the Court to make appropriate findings and rulings on the case, there must be a clear designation that distinguishes unique or proprietary material from the vast body of the ... program and source code, and apprises a person what trade secrets ... plaintiffs claim are to be found in [it]. That cannot be done on the present record.”


 


 


 



 



 

 

 
     
     
 


Fact Witness Properly Instructed Not to Answer Hypothetical Questions at Deposition
 

 

 

 


 


 

Dean Foods Company v. Pappathanasi, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 216
(June 8, 2004, 01-2595 BLS) (Van Gestel, J.).

     

At a deposition, plaintiff’s counsel asked a lawyer who participated in drafting an opinion letter whether he would have done things differently if certain facts had been different. The deponent’s counsel instructed him not to answer on the grounds that these were hypothetical questions. Although Judge Van Gestel noted that the proper

 

 

 

 

procedure would have been to bring a motion for protection before the court, he denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel. “In the litigation setting, a hypothetical question does not seek facts but rather calls for an opinion by an expert witness.” As a fact witness, the deponent was not required to answer hypothetical questions.

 

 

 

 



 

 
     
     


Anti-SLAPP Statute Does Not Apply Where Defendant Fails to Prove it is the Petitioner in the Underlying Action
 

 

 

 


 



 

JMK, Inc. v. Lee Imported Cars, Inc., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 202
(June 4, 2004, 04-0944 BLS) (Van Gestel, J.).

     

Defendant Lee Imported Cars, Inc. (“Lee”) brought a special motion to dismiss pursuant to M.G.L. ch. 231, § 59H, contending that the Plaintiff’s claims were based solely upon another action in which Hilltop Gardens Investment LLC (“Hilltop”) had filed an appeal to the Land Court from a decision of the Norwood

 

 


 

 

Zoning Board of Appeals, relating to plaintiff’s plan to open a competing automobile dealership in Norwood. Judge Van Gestel denied the motion, holding that Hilltop and Lee were separate legal entities and Lee had failed to prove its connection to Hilltop.

 

 

 

 




 

 
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