A quarterly summary and brief analysis of significant decisions issued by the Massachusetts Superior Court Business Litigation Session. A service of O’Connor, Carnathan and Mack LLC.
 

July 2006

Volume 3
Number 1
Page 1

 

Summarizing opinions from January 1, 2006 through
May 31, 2006


A Primer on the Work Product Doctrine, Attorney-Client Privilege and Joint Defense Privilege in the Context of Unfair and Deceptive Insurance Claim Settlement Practices
 


 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

     

F  E  A  T  U  R  E  D     D  E  C  I  S  I  O  N  :

Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 20 Mass. L. Rep. 491, 2006 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 19
(Jan. 27, 2006) (Gants, J.).

     

In resolving a discovery dispute that arose in connection with a claim against an insurer pursuant to M.G.L. ch. 93A and 176D (together “176D”) for failing to act reasonably and in good faith in settling plaintiffs’ personal injury claims, the Court wrote a primer on the work product doctrine, attorney-client privilege and joint defense privilege that is required reading for attorneys litigating similar cases in the future. Indeed, the opinion provides a review of these doctrines that will be useful in any kind of litigation.

Plaintiff Marcia Rhodes was paralyzed from the waist down in a car accident. Defendant Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”) provided the personal injury claim defendants with primary coverage of $2 million. Zurich did not offer policy limits for over 2 years, despite strong evidence of liability and extensive damages. When it finally did offer policy limits, it conditioned the offer on a full release of all defendants, which plaintiffs rejected. The jury ultimately awarded plaintiffs $9.4 million in damages, to which $2.5 million in pre-judgment interested was added.

In the subsequent 176D litigation, the plaintiffs sought discovery of the insurance companies’ claims files, including: (1) internal memoranda and correspondence created before litigation was threatened or commenced; (2) internal memoranda and correspondence created after litigation was threatened or commenced; (3) correspondence between or among the parties and their attorneys; (4) communications among the defendants and an insurance broker; (5) documents regarding the reserve amounts set in the underlying case; and (6) defendants’ claims manuals.

The Court also held that the parties had waived the privilege with regard to communications in which an insurance broker was copied, that the documents setting the reserve amounts were opinion work product that must be disclosed, and that the defendants’ claims manuals were relevant and had to be produced.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Court held that internal memoranda and correspondence created before litigation was threatened or commenced are prepared “in the ordinary line of business or duty,” and did not constitute work product. The Court rejected the contention that an insurance company always acts in anticipation of litigation. The Court also noted that even if these materials were work product, as a practical matter, at least the factual reports would be discoverable because the plaintiffs would have a substantial need for the materials to prove their case.

The Court applied this reasoning to internal memoranda and correspondence created after litigation was threatened or commenced, and held that factual reports were discoverable under the exception to work product protection set forth in Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) where the party seeking discovery has a substantial need for the materials and cannot obtain the substantial equivalent without undue hardship.

The Court distinguished memoranda and correspondence containing opinion work product, which are entitled to a higher level of protection. Because of the nature of a 176D claim, the Court nevertheless concluded that the defendants were obligated to produce any such materials. “The need for disclosure of the opinion work product in the insurance claims file becomes clear when one considers that the plaintiffs are certainly entitled to depose the claims representative responsible for determining the settlement offer and ask him to explain his reasons for making that offer.”

The Court next held that correspondence between the parties and their attorneys was protected by the attorney-client privilege, unless the defendants asserted advice of counsel as a defense. In order to sort out the privilege issues, the Court also analyzed the joint defense privilege, and concluded that Massachusetts recognizes this privilege under appropriate circumstances. 


 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
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