A quarterly summary and brief analysis of significant decisions issued by the Massachusetts Superior Court Business Litigation Session. A service of O’Connor, Carnathan and Mack LLC.
 

October
2008

Volume 5
Number 2
Page 1

 

Summarizing opinions from April. 1, 2008 through
June. 30, 2008


 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

     

F  E  A  T  U  R  E  D     D  E  C  I  S  I  O  N  :

Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 2008 WL 2357015
(Mass. Super. June 3, 2008) (Gants, J.).

     

In Rhodes, the court held that AIG Domestic Claims, Inc. (fka AIG Technical Services) (“AIGDC”) failed to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement of a tort claim in which liability was reasonably clear. After at 16-day bench trial, the Court awarded $896,500 in damages and attorney’s fees against AIGDC. The facts are long and complex; a significantly shortened account follows.
Rhodes was rendered a paraplegic in a car accident, when an 18-wheeler hit her stopped car. The driver of the truck admitted the accident was his fault. GAF Building Corp., the company for whom he was driving at the time, was self-insured for $250,000, after which it had a primary automobile insurance policy of $2 million with Zurich American Insurance Company (the “primary carrier”) and a $50 million excess umbrella policy administered by AIGDC for the issuer, National Union Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh.

On January 9, 2002, GAF’s third-party claims administrator received plaintiff’s notice of claim. The administrator quickly determined the claim was “catastrophic” and carried a “high value.”

On July 12, 2002, Rhodes, her husband and daughter (together, “plaintiffs”) commenced a lawsuit. On July 22, 2003, plaintiffs made a demand of $18.5 million to settle their claims. By December 2003, the adjuster for the primary policy had concluded that the primary policy limits of $2 million should be tendered to AIGDC. She concluded that there was a 100% probability of a plaintiffs’ verdict, and no possibility of comparative negligence. She estimated the total damage award could be as high as $17.88 million. On January 23, 2004, the adjuster for the primary carrier telephoned AIGDC and orally tendered the policy limits. On April 5, 2004, the primary tendered the $2 million in writing.

At the mediation, on August 11, 2004, AIGDC’s offer never exceeded $3.5 million. During trial, AIGDC increased its offer to $6 million.

On September 15, 2004, the jury awarded plaintiffs $9,412,000. With interest and after deducting a settlement of $550,000 from another defendant, the amount due to the plaintiffs was approximately $11.3 million.

AIGDC moved for a new trial, then appealed. On December 17, 2004, it increased its settlement offer to $7 million, including the primary policy’s $2 million. On December 22, 2004, the primary carrier tendered the full policy proceeds plus interest directly to the plaintiffs, without getting a release.

On June 2, 2005, after some further negotiations, AIGDC agreed to pay $8.965 million and withdraw its appeal. Together with the other sums paid by the other parties, this meant that the plaintiffs obtained approximately $11.835 million in settlement of their tort action. They did not agree to withdraw their 93A action against AIGDC as part of the settlement.

Pursuant to M.G.L. ch. 176D, § 3(9)(f), an insurance company owes a duty both to its policy holders and third parties making claims against its policy holders to “effectuate, prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.” In this context, “liability encompasses both fault and damages.” The court rejected AIGDC’s contention that the damages were not reasonably clear until the jury rendered its verdict, because pain and suffering and loss of consortium are “inherently unclear and unquantifiable.” “The Supreme Judicial Court has plainly rejected this proposition, which would effectively negate the statutory obligation of insurance companies to make a prompt and fair settlement offer in nearly all tort cases.”

The court found that the primary carrier made a reasonably prompt tender of policy limits where it had “completed its due diligence” by November 19, 2003

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

and tendered by January 23, 2004. The amount at issue -- $2 million – was substantial, and it was reasonable for the carrier to require a detailed written justification and high-level approval before making the tender. In any event, given the conduct of the excess carrier, even if the primary had tendered earlier, there would have been no impact on AIGDC’s offer to the plaintiff.

With regard to AIGDC, however, the court held that the insurer had breached its statutory obligations. The court agreed that AIGDC was reasonable to insist that the plaintiff undergo an independent medical examination (“IME”) before mediation, but rejected AIGDC’s contention that it needed Rhodes’s psychological records before it could determine if liability was reasonably certain. “If a settlement offer is allowed to await the completion of any possible discovery that may be admissible at trial on the issue of damages based on the premise that liability is not reasonably clear until every bit of possible evidence has been located and scrutinized, then the obligation to give a prompt settlement offer would be rendered toothless.”

The court held that liability, including the extent of the plaintiffs’ damages, was reasonably clear by December 5, 2003, when the final version of the defense life care plan was completed. Even giving AIGDC a “generous amount of time” to resolve issues, it should have made a settlement offer by May 1, 2004.
The court held that the $3.5 million AIGDC offered at the August 11, 2004 mediation was at the “low end of the reasonable range of settlement offers.” It then examined whether AIGDC caused the plaintiff to suffer damages by failing to make a reasonable settlement offer between May 1, 2004 and August 11, 2004. Plaintiffs would not have accepted less than $8 million, so even if AIGDC had made a prompt offer of $3.5 million, plaintiffs would have rejected it.

Although the insurer’s obligation to make a reasonable settlement offer is not dependent on the plaintiff’s willingness to accept one, the plaintiff must still prove that the insurers’ conduct “caused a loss.” The statute provides that the penalty for failing to make a reasonable settlement offer is to multiply the actual judgment by two or three times. But before that penalty applies, the violation must be willful and knowing, and must cause the plaintiff actual damages, otherwise “a smart plaintiff (or a plaintiff intelligently represented), once he recognized that the insurer had failed to make a prompt or reasonable offer, would choose not to settle the case and proceed to trial, even if the insurer later made a reasonable settlement offer, because the plaintiff could obtain punitive damages of double or treble the underlying judgment only if he proceeded to judgment.” Accordingly, where plaintiffs failed to prove any actual damages, they were not entitled to an award of actual or punitive damages based on the failure to settle pre-trial.

The court further found that AIGDC again violated its obligations after losing a jury verdict, by offering only 60% of the verdict in settlement. “AIGDC did precisely what Chapter 176D was intended to prevent – bully the plaintiffs into accepting an unreasonably low settlement rather than wait the roughly two years for their appeal to conclude and the judgment to be paid.” This time, the facts showed that if AIGDC had made a reasonable offer, the case would have settled, because ultimately it did. Accordingly, the plaintiff could prove “loss of use” damages from AIGDC’s failure to make a prompt, reasonable settlement offer, and the court awarded damages of $448,250. The court declined to award emotional distress damages. The court also awarded double damages and attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting the Chapter 93A Action.


 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 
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